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Avian inﬂ uenza A H5N1 viruses have caused many, typically severe, human infections since the ﬁ rst human case was 
reported in 1997. However, no comprehensive epidemiological analysis of global human cases of H5N1 from 1997 to 
2015 exists. Moreover, few studies have examined in detail the changing epidemiology of human H5N1 cases in Egypt, 
especially given the outbreaks since November, 2014, which have the highest number of cases ever reported worldwide 
in a similar period. Data on individual patients were collated from diﬀ erent sources using a systematic approach to 
describe the global epidemiology of 907 human H5N1 cases between May, 1997, and April, 2015. The number of 
aﬀ ected countries rose between 2003 and 2008, with expansion from east and southeast Asia, then to west Asia and 
Africa. Most cases (67·2%) occurred from December to March, and the overall case-fatality risk was 483 (53·5%) of 
903 cases which varied across geographical regions. Although the incidence in Egypt has increased dramatically since 
November, 2014, compared with the cases beforehand, there were no signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in the fatality risk, history 
of exposure to poultry, history of patient contact, and time from onset to hospital admission in the recent cases.
Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian inﬂ uenza A H5N1 virus was ﬁ rst 
isolated from and characterised in a domestic goose in 
Guangdong province, China, in 1996,1 and outbreaks have 
since been reported in domestic poultry, wild birds, and 
humans in more than 60 countries.2–4 The spread of 
highly pathogenic avian inﬂ uenza A H5N1 virus in 
poultry populations increases the risk of human 
infections.5–8 The ﬁ rst reported case of human illness 
caused by H5N1 infection occurred in May, 1997, in Hong 
Kong, China, with a total of 18 cases and six deaths.9–12 
After an apparent 5-year absence, two cases of H5N1 
infection in people who had a history of travel to southern 
China were reported in February, 2003, in Hong Kong.13 
Following the pattern of spread and persistence of the 
virus in poultry, human cases of H5N1 infection with 
high mortality were subsequently detected in China,14,15 
southeast Asia,16,17 west Asia,18,19 and Africa, with cases 
detected in Egypt every year from 2006 to 2015.20–23 
Compared with previous years,24–26 the incidence of 
human H5N1 cases has remained at a low level worldwide 
between October, 2012, and October, 2014,27,28 and attention 
has focused on the emergence of variant swine 
inﬂ uenza A H3N2 virus in North America,29 
avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus in China,30–32 other avian 
inﬂ uenza A H5 virus subtypes in Asia, Europe, and North 
America,27,33 and other emerging infections.34–36
However, between Nov 1, 2014, and April 30, 2015, 
165 cases of human H5N1 infection (including 48 deaths) 
were reported to WHO.37 This is, by far, the highest 
number of human cases ever reported globally over a 
similar period.38 Moreover, the number of human H5N1 
cases reported in Egypt in February, 2015, is the highest 
number reported by any country in a single month.39 
Emergence of a new cluster of H5N1 clade 2.2.1.2 has 
been found in poultry in Egypt since mid-2014 and has 
quickly become predominant.40 It is not yet known 
whether or not this emerging phylotype has increased 
zoonotic potential and, thus, can be transmitted more 
eﬃ  ciently to humans.39–41
Comprehensive epidemiological analysis of global 
human cases of H5N1 from 1997–2015 is scarce,17,42–45 and 
few studies have presented in detail the changing 
epidemiology of human H5N1 cases in Egypt by comparing 
the cases before November, 2014, with the most recent 
outbreaks from November, 2014, to April, 2015.20,40,46 To 
improve understanding of the epidemiology of highly 
pathogenic avian inﬂ uenza H5N1 virus, we did a systematic 
review of individual case data to describe the magnitude 
and distribution of all human H5N1 cases globally with 
illness onset between May 1, 1997, and April 30, 2015. We 
focused on the characteristics of patients, seasonal and 
geographical patterns, and examined in more detail the 
epidemiology of human H5N1 cases in Egypt.
Methods
Search strategy and selection criteria
Human H5N1 case data were identiﬁ ed and compiled 
according to the probable and conﬁ rmed case deﬁ nitions 
described below. Data on all human H5N1 cases in 
mainland China were downloaded from the online 
National Notiﬁ able Infectious Disease Reporting 
Information System at the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention.30,47 Data on human H5N1 cases 
in Vietnam and Azerbaijan as of April 30, 2014, were 
provided by the Vietnam National Institute of Hygiene 
and Epidemiology and the Azerbaijan Ministry of Health. 
Data on human H5N1 cases in all other aﬀ ected countries 
or regions were obtained from publicly available sources 
(appendix), including the WHO Disease Outbreak News 
of the Global Alert and Response,48 the WHO Weekly 
Epidemiological Record,49 the WHO Western Paciﬁ c 
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Region’s Avian Inﬂ uenza Weekly Update,50 the 
FluTrackers website,51 and the websites of the ministries 
of health in individual countries or regions.
We also searched PubMed for related studies using a 
systematic review approach that followed the Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines (ﬁ gure 1).52 Articles 
published from May 1, 1997, to April 30, 2015, were 
indentiﬁ ed with the query “(H5N1[Title] AND 
(PATIENT[Title] OR PATIENTS[Title] OR HUMAN[Title] 
OR HUMANS[Title] OR PERSON[Title] OR CASE[Title] 
OR CASES[Title])) AND (“1997/05/01”[Date-Publication]: 
“2015/04/30”[Date-Publication])”. Articles published in 
English and Chinese were included, and full-text Chinese 
articles were found by searches of China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure and Wanfang Data. Relevant 
articles published between 1997 and 2015 were identiﬁ ed 
through searches in reports from WHO and ProMed-mail 
posts. Articles resulting from these searches and relevant 
references cited in those articles were reviewed.
WHO Disease Outbreak News of the Global Alert and 
Response updates and WHO statistics on the cumulative 
number of conﬁ rmed human H5N1 cases from 
November, 2003, to April, 2015, were used to establish a 
list of human H5N1 cases.48,53 All cases from sources other 
than WHO updates were matched with the initial list 
(ﬁ gure 1). New cases, which were not yet oﬃ  cially 
announced by WHO, were identiﬁ ed with ProMed-mail 
posts and FluTrackers, and conﬁ rmed by the 
announcements of ministries of health in individual 
countries or regions. When crucial information was 
missing, additional information was sought from 
published literature, ProMed-mail posts and English 
language news releases from the regional oﬃ  ce of WHO 
and the relevant ministry of health (appendix p 1).18,50,54–56
Case deﬁ nition
WHO case deﬁ nition was used to deﬁ ne cases of H5N1 
infection.57 A conﬁ rmed case was deﬁ ned as a human case 
of inﬂ uenza A H5N1 virus infection reported by WHO and 
with laboratory conﬁ rmation—ie, a patient with deﬁ ned 
clinical signs, epidemiological linkage, and laboratory 
conﬁ rmation by an inﬂ uenza laboratory accepted by 
WHO, as speciﬁ ed in WHO case deﬁ nition. Other reported 
cases were considered as probable cases if they had 
exposure to other conﬁ rmed patients or to sick or dead 
poultry, or the H5N1 infection was conﬁ rmed by the 
country or local institutions, but did not meet WHO 
criteria or was not announced by WHO.
Data variables and extraction
All probable and conﬁ rmed cases with illness onset by 
April 30, 2015, were included in the analysis. Individual 
data on cases included age, sex, country, type of diagnosis, 
year, month and day of onset, date of hospital admission, 
ﬁ nal outcome (fatal or non-fatal), date of outcome, and 
potential risk factors (appendix pp 8–9). Information on 
exposure potentially related to the acquisition of H5N1 
infections was collected (panel). Where contradictory 
information was found for a given variable, WHO and 
ministry of health data were given priority over journal 
articles, and journal articles were given priority over other 
Figure 1: Study selection and collection of individual case data
466 reports identiﬁed in PubMed
350 reports excluded
         331 not data of individual case
            16 not in English or Chinese
              3 duplicates
164 records identiﬁed in other sources
 86 WHO reports of Weekly 
 Epidemiological Record
 61 ProMED-mail posts
 17 WHO reports of genetic 
 characteristics of H5N1 viruses
195 cases’ data provided by health agencies
 134 in Vietnam
 52 in mainland China
 9 in Azerbaijan
907 cases included in this study after 251 duplicates removed
 858 conﬁrmed cases
 49 probable cases
280 cases’ data from FluTrackers
 150 from 2015
 60 from 2014
 39 from 2013
 31 from 2012
116 records included in review
269 reports included in data extraction after 11 duplicates removed
858 laboratory-conﬁrmed H5N1 cases including 840 reported
 to WHO since 2003, plus 18 in Hong Kong in 1997
868 cases after duplicates removed
889 cases after 259 duplicates removed
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sources of information (appendix p 1). Epidemic curves 
were plotted and the patient characteristics were 
summarised by outcome and geographical region.
Data on the clade or subclade of H5N1 isolated from 
patients were collated from the regular WHO reports.58 
17 reports issued between August, 2006, and February, 
2015, were reviewed, which provided information on 
H5N1 clades circulating and characterised from 
1997 to February, 2015.58 However, not all individual 
cases were reported with laboratory results of the clade 
or subclade. Where this information was not available, 
the infection was presumed to be in the clade or subclade 
of H5N1 that was present in the same period and 
area.17,40,42,59,60 All data used in this study were anonymised.
Ethical approval
The National Health and Family Planning Commission 
of China, the Ministry of Health of Vietnam, and the 
Ministry of Health of Azerbaijan determined that the 
collection of data from human cases of avian inﬂ uenza A 
H5N1 virus infection was part of the public health 
investigation of an outbreak and was exempt from 
institutional review board assessment. All other data 
from other countries were obtained from publicly 
available data sources. All data were supplied and 
analysed in an anonymous format, without access to 
personal identifying information.
Results
907 human cases of H5N1 infection were reported 
globally between May 1, 1997, and April 30, 2015, of which 
94·6% were conﬁ rmed cases and 5·4% were probable 
cases (table 1, ﬁ gure 2). The number of cases per year 
varied, with the highest numbers recorded in 2015 
(ﬁ gure 3, appendix p 18, 19). The total number of cases 
(n=213) in 2014–15 was greater than that recorded from 
2010–13 (n=181; appendix p 19), with the highest number 
of cases recorded in February, 2015, when 55 cases were 
reported in Egypt and one in China.
The overall male-to-female ratio was almost even (1:1·2) 
from 1997 to 2014, although this pattern was not uniform 
across regions (table 1). The median age of patients was 
19 years (IQR 5–32), and 363 (41·2%) of 881 cases were in 
children younger than 15 years and 707 (80·3%) of 
881 cases were in people younger than 35 years. The 
median age of patients who had non-fatal cases of H5N1 
infection was lower in north Africa and older in east and 
southeast Asia (median 6 years [IQR 3–31] vs 18·5 years 
[6–30]), but the median age of patients who had fatal cases 
was higher in north Africa than in east and southeast Asia 
(30 years [20–36] vs 19 years [9–30]; ﬁ gure 4).
16 countries reported human cases between 1997 and 
2015. The number of aﬀ ected countries has risen 
between 2003 and 2008, with expansion from east Asia 
to southeast Asia, then west Asia, north Africa, and 
other regions, and apparent ongoing transmission and 
cases reported almost every year in China, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Egypt (appendix p 20). The 
incidence in Asia remained at low levels in 2013–15, 
while the number of cases in Egypt has increased in 
2014–15. During 1997–2015, 594 (67·2%) of 884 cases 
were reported between December and March, with a 
peak in January (20·9%; appendix p 21). However, 
compared with countries in southeast Asia and north 
Africa, countries in east Asia and west Asia had fewer 
cases in the warm or hot season from April to September 
(8·1% vs 26·2%), and showed earlier peaks (December 
vs January) and shorter epidemic periods, with cases 
occurring year-round in southeast Asia and north 
Africa, but from January to June and October to 
December in east Asia, and only from December to 
March in west Asia (appendix p 20, 21).
Panel: Deﬁ nition of exposures to poultry and humans
Occupational exposure to live poultry
Poultry-related exposure at place of work (eg, people involved in the breeding, 
traﬃ  cking, sale, and quarantine of poultry) in the 2 weeks before symptom onset
Exposure to poultry at live bird markets
Visit of a wholesale or retail market of live poultry or birds in the 2 weeks before 
symptom onset
Exposure to sick or dead poultry
Direct physical contact with, or proximity to, sick or dead poultry or poultry products 
(eg, meat) or faeces in the 2 weeks before symptom onset
Exposure to backyard poultry
Direct physical contact with, or proximity to poultry raised in the backyard within 
2 weeks before symptom onset
Any exposure to poultry
Direct or indirect contact with, or proximity to healthy, sick, or dead poultry (including 
any kind of poultry or birds—eg, chickens, ducks, geese, pet birds, pigeons) in live bird 
markets, backyards, farms, or neighbourhoods, or consumption of improperly 
processed poultry products
Exposure to virus through patient contact
A patient with a history of close contact with a person with conﬁ rmed or probable 
inﬂ uenza H5N1 virus infection (at any time from the day before symptom onset to 
death, or during the period that the patient was admitted into hospital) in the 2 weeks 
before symptom onset
Total (n=907) East and southeast 
Asia (n=505)
North Africa 
(n=363)
Other (n=39)
Type of case
Conﬁ rmed 858 (94·6%) 479 (94·9%) 343 (94·5%) 36 (92·3%)
Probable 49 (5·4%) 26 (5·1%) 20 (5·5%) 3 (7·7%)
Sex
Female 476 (52·5%) 246 (48·7%) 213 (58·7%) 17 (43·6%)
Unknown 29 (3·2%) 21 (4·2%) 6 (1·7%) 2 (5·1%)
Age, years
Median (IQR) 19 (5–32) 19 (8–30) 20 (4–34) 15 (5–22)
(Table 1 continues on next page)
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After exclusion of four cases with unknown outcome 
(two from Vietnam in 2005 and two from Egypt in 
2015), the overall case-fatality risk was 53·5% (483 of 
903 cases), with a decrease from 70·7% (275 of 
420 cases) in 2003–08 to 43·4% (202 of 465 cases) in 
2009–15, and varied across geographical regions, with 
a case-fatality risk (69·4%, 349 of 503 cases) in east and 
southeast Asia more than two times that in north 
Africa (32·1%, 116 of 361 cases; table 1). The age 
distribution of patients also diﬀ ered by outcome, with 
a median age of 22 years (IQR 12–32) for patients with 
fatal cases and 10 years (3–30) in patients who recovered 
(ﬁ gure 3). Most cases (95·8%, 748 of 781) reported 
exposure to poultry including 85·7% (439 of 
512 patients) exposed to sick or dead poultry, 61·4% 
(188 of 306 patients) exposed to backyard poultry, 
26·4% (82 of 311 patients) exposed to poultry at live 
bird markets, and 4·7% (15 of 321 patients) 
occupationally exposed to live poultry. Additionally, 
6·2% (49 of 792 patients) reported contact with a 
patient with human H5N1 infection before the onset of 
illness (table 1, appendix p 10). Time from onset of 
illness to hospital admission was available for 79·7% 
(723 of 907 patients) with a median of 4 days (IQR 2–6). 
Generally, patients who survived were admitted into 
hospital earlier than patients who died (median 3 days 
[IQR 1–6] vs 5 days [3–7]; appendix). Additionally, 
patients in north Africa had a shorter time from onset 
to hospital admission than patients in east and 
southeast Asia (3 days [1–6] vs 5 days [3–7]), but the 
median time from onset to outcome was the same 
(10 days) between patients in north Africa and cases in 
east and southeast Asia.
The inﬂ uenza A H5N1 viruses in human cases have 
been characterised as clade or subclade 0, 1, 2.1, 2.1, 2.3, 
and 7 (table 1, 2; appendix p 10). Clade 1 was ﬁ rst reported 
in Hong Kong in 2003, and then reported in southeast 
Asia each year from 2003 to 2014, but subclade 2.1 was only 
reported in Indonesia since 2005, and subclade 2.2 has 
circulated in Egypt since 2006 with sporadic reporting in 
Africa and west Asia. Additionally, subclade 2.3 has been 
reported in east and southeast Asia since 2005.
From March, 2006, to April, 2015, a total of 363 human 
cases with inﬂ uenza A H5N1 virus infection were 
reported in Egypt with 116 deaths (32%; appendix p 23), 
of which 51% of cases were reported during the 
6 months between November, 2014, and April, 2015 
(appendix p 15). The male-to-female ratio was not 
signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent between cases before November, 
2014, and cases in the period from November, 2014, to 
April, 2015, but of the latter cases, patients had a higher 
median age (26 years, IQR 4–38) than before November, 
2014 (16 years, 3–30), which was also diﬀ erent for both 
non-fatal and fatal cases (ﬁ gure 4). However, the case-
fatality risk was not signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent at 36% (64 of 
178 cases) before November, 2014, compared with 28·4% 
(52 of 183 cases) during November, 2014, to April, 2015 
Total (n=907) East and southeast 
Asia (n=505)
North Africa 
(n=363)
Other (n=39)
(Continued from previous page)
Final outcome
Death 483 (53·3%) 349 (69·1%) 116 (32·0%) 18 (46·2%)
Unknown 4 (0·4%) 2 (0·4%) 2 (0·6%) 0
Hospital admission
Yes 819 (90·3%) 438 (86·7%) 353 (97·2%) 28 (71·8%)
Unknown 82 (9·0%) 64 (12·7%) 9 (2·5%) 9 (23·1%)
Time delay from onset to hospital admission, days
Median time (IQR) 4 (2–6) 5 (3–7) 3 (1–6) 2 (1–5)
Unknown 184 (20·3%) 121 (24·0%) 46 (12·7%) 17 (43·6%)
Time delay from hospital admission to death or discharge (recovery), days
Median time (IQR) 5 (2–9) 4 (2–9) 5 (2–9) 5 (3–18)
Unknown 403 (44·4%) 166 (32·9%) 219 (60·3%) 18 (46·2%)
Time delay from onset to death or discharge (recovery), days
Median time (IQR) 10 (7–15) 10 (7–15) 10 (7–14) 9 (7–20)
Unknown 360 (39·7%) 124 (24·6%) 221 (60·9%) 15 (38·5%)
Predominant clade or subclade
0 18 (2·0%) 18 (3·6%) 0 0
1 193 (21·3%) 193 (38·2%) 0 0
2.1 208 (22·9%) 208 (41·2%) 0 0
2.2 393 (43·3%) 0 363 (100%) 30 (76·9%)
2.3 89 (9·8%) 84 (16·6%) 0 5 (12·8%)
7 2 (0·2%) 2 (0·4%) 0 0
Unknown 4 (0·4%) 0 0 4 (10·3%)
Exposure history
Any exposure to poultry
Exposure 748 (82·5%) 382 (75·6%) 339 (93·4%) 27 (69·2%)
Unknown 126 (13·9%) 94 (18·6%) 24 (6·6%) 8 (20·5%)
Occupational exposure to live poultry
Exposure 15 (1·7%) 12 (2·4%) 2 (0·6%) 1 (2·6%)
Unknown 586 (64·6%) 289 (57·2%) 286 (78·8%) 11 (28·2%)
Visits to live bird markets
Visits 82 (9·0%) 68 (13·5%) 11 (3·0%) 3 (7·7%)
Unknown 596 (65·7%) 296 (58·6%) 286 (78·8%) 14 (35·9%)
Exposure to sick or dead poultry
Exposure 439 (48·4%) 242 (47·9%) 174 (47·9%) 23 (59·0%)
Unknown 395 (43·6%) 217 (43·0%) 166 (45·7%) 12 (30·8%)
Exposure to backyard poultry
Exposure 188 (20·7%) 113 (22·4%) 64 (17·6%) 11 (28·2%)
Unknown 601 (66·3%) 301 (59·6%) 286 (78·8%) 14 (35·9%)
Human case contact
Contact 49 (5·4%) 35 (6·9%) 3 (0·8%) 11 (28·2%)
Unknown 115 (12·7%) 86 (17·0%) 21 (5·8%) 8 (20·5%)
Data are presented as n (%) of patients unless otherwise indicated. East and southeast Asia (505 cases): Indonesia 
(208), Vietnam (134), Cambodia (58), mainland China (52), Thailand (27), Hong Kong (23), Laos (2), and Myanmar (1). 
North Africa (363): Egypt (363). Other (39): Turkey (12), Azerbaijan (9), Bangladesh (7), Pakistan (4), Iraq (3), Nigeria 
(2), Djibouti (1), and Canada (1). Data on H5N1 clade or subclade were based on the reports from WHO website or 
scientiﬁ c literature, and the known geographic distribution of the viruses. Not all cases were laboratory conﬁ rmed and 
reported with clade results, so we presumed that the case in each area was infected by the reported predominant clade 
or subclade of H5N1 in the same period and area. The clade or subclade in each area were clade 0 in Hong Kong in 
1997; clade 1 in Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Hong Kong; subclade 2.1 mainly in Indonesia; subclade 2.2 in Egypt, 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Nigeria, and Djibouti; subclade 2.3 in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Laos, Canada, and 
Myanmar; and clade 7 in mainland China. Clade data were unavailable for four cases in Pakistan in 2007. 
Table 1: Characteristics of patients with H5N1 infection by geographic region, May, 1997, to April, 2015
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Figure 2: Geographic distribution of human cases of H5N1 infection by outcome, May, 1997, to April, 2015 (n=907)
Data for China include cases reported by mainland China (52 cases) and Hong Kong, China (23 cases). In the pie charts, the blue sectors show the proportion of 
non-fatal cases, the red fatal cases, and the green unresolved cases. The numbers beneath the country names show numbers of cases: fatal/non-fatal/unresolved.
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Figure 3: Epidemic curve of human cases of H5N1 infection by region, May, 1997, to April, 2015
(A) H5N1 human cases reported worldwide (884 cases). (B) East and southeast Asian countries (484 cases) were Indonesia (187), Vietnam (134), Cambodia (58), mainland China (52), Thailand (27), 
Hong Kong (23), Laos (2), and Myanmar (1). (C) North African countries (363 cases) were Egypt (363). Month of illness was unknown in 23 cases (21 cases in Indonesia in 2009 and two cases in Turkey 
in 2006) and were excluded from this epidemic curve.
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(appendix p 15). For fatal cases, the median time and 
IQR (5 days, 3–6) for onset to hospital admission was 
the same from March, 2006, to October, 2014, and 
November, 2014, to April, 2015, but the time was 
diﬀ erent for non-fatal cases before November, 2014 
(1 day, 1–3), and in November, 2014, to April, 2015, 
(4 days, 2–6). Most cases reported a history of poultry 
exposure—96·1% before November, 2014, and 90·8% in 
November, 2014, to April, 2015.
Discussion
In this Review, a global dataset spanning 18 years was 
systematically collated to investigate changes in the 
epidemiological characteristics of human H5N1 cases, 
and we focused on Egypt, given its unique situation of 
increasing incidence since November, 2014.20,37,46 Our 
ﬁ ndings suggest that the geographical extent of human 
H5N1 cases has expanded from east Asia to southeast 
Asia, then to west Asia and north Africa in 2003–09, 
which could be related to global spread of the virus via 
bird migration.61–63 The bird migration network was 
shown to better reﬂ ect the observed viral gene sequence 
data than other networks (eg, poultry trade networks) 
and contributes to seasonal H5N1 epidemics in local 
regions.3,5,7 Additionally, previous evidence showed 
Siberia as a major hub for the spread of the virus via 
Figure 4: Age distribution of human cases with H5N1 infection by gender, geographic regions, and outcome, May, 1997, to April, 2015
(A) All male (n=401) and female cases (n=476). (B) All fatal (n=463) and non-fatal cases (n=416). (C) Non-fatal cases in north Africa (n=245) and east and southeast 
Asia (n=152). (D) Fatal cases in north Africa (n=116) and east and southeast Asia (n=329). (E) Non-fatal cases in Egypt before (n=114) and since Nov 1, 2014 (n=131). 
(F) Fatal cases in Egypt before (n=64) and since Nov 1, 2014 (n=52).
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birds, and southeast Asia and Africa as areas of local 
virus persistence and the major sources of genetically 
and antigenically novel strains.5,7,64,65 Therefore, the 
increasing range of virus spread and outbreaks among 
birds might also increase the risk of human exposure.3,66 
However, some of the apparent geographical spread in 
cases could also be attributable to enhanced clinical and 
laboratory surveillance capacity in the past 15–20 years.
Human H5N1 infections were found to exhibit 
seasonality, related to the cooler season from December 
to March and across diverse climate zones in the northern 
hemisphere (appendix p 20, 21), which might correlate 
with the migration patterns of wild birds and the activity 
of the virus in winter or cooler seasons.3,7,43 Investigators 
of a 2015 study found that the timing of H5N1 outbreaks 
and viral migrations were closely associated with bird 
migration networks in Asia.5 Additionally, the lower 
temperatures in Asia and north Africa across diverse 
climates were associated with increasing cases of human 
H5N1 infection in winter, which is consistent with 
increased poultry outbreaks and H5N1 transmission 
during cold and dry conditions, and also overlapped with 
human seasonal inﬂ uenza epidemics.3,43,67,68
Although most human populations are thought to have 
little or no immunity to inﬂ uenza A H5N1 viruses, most 
patients examined in this study were children and 
younger adults, and these age groups were also more 
likely to recover, whereas the fatality risk was higher in 
adults, which might be related to the immunological 
reaction of the virus in diﬀ erent age groups.41 Consistent 
with previous reports,28,45 the cases in which time from 
onset of illness to hospital admission was 3 days or more 
were more likely to be fatal than those admitted to 
hospital within 3 days of onset with an odds ratios (OR) 
of 3·6 (95% CI 2·5–5·1), which might be because of the 
early administration of antiviral treatment, or selection 
bias where the patients admitted to hospital later after 
onset were more likely to be severe.17 Compared with 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, mainland China, and 
Thailand, the lower case-fatality risk in Egypt might be 
related to a less virulent virus clade, less severe clinical 
disease, and earlier identiﬁ cation, earlier hospital 
admission, and early treatment with oseltamivir for 
H5N1 cases.20,22,44 However, the case-fatality risk might be 
underestimated because various government entities or 
reports might not have identiﬁ ed or updated data on 
which cases had died at the time we collated data. 
Additionally, almost all human cases of H5N1 infection 
had close contact (in the 2 weeks before symptom onset) 
with infected live or dead birds, other human cases, or 
H5N1-contaminated environ ments, which reaﬃ  rmed 
reports that human inﬂ uenza H5N1 virus infection is 
typically preceded by exposure to sick or dead poultry in 
backyards, live bird markets, or farms.69–73
An increased number of animal-to-human infections 
has been reported by Egypt during November, 2014, to 
April, 2015, with the number of cases more than the total 
of the past 8 years (2006–14).20 The increase in the 
number of human cases in Egypt since November, 2014, 
can be attributed to a mixture of factors, including 
increased circulation of inﬂ uenza H5N1 viruses in 
poultry, lower public health awareness of risks in central 
and northern Egypt and seasonal factors, such as closer 
proximity to poultry because of cold weather and possible 
longer survival of the viruses in the environment.74 
However, the increased numbers of human cases in 
Egypt are of major concern because of the continued 
potential pandemic threat from H5N1. A few cases of 
human-to-human transmission and family clusters have 
been reported in Egypt and other countries.40,46,75–79 
Nevertheless, inﬂ uenza H5N1 viruses do not appear to 
transmit easily from person to person, and the risk of 
community-level spread of these viruses remains 
low.20,27,39
Inﬂ uenza H5N1 viruses have evolved from the 1996 
progenitor strain and now comprise at least ten clades, 
through a complexity of genetic changes, which have 
infected domestic poultry and wild birds in many 
countries.1,21,61,62,80 In this study, four clades (0, 1, 2, and 7) 
and three subclades (2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) of H5N1 strains 
have infected humans, all of which have been reported in 
human cases before 2006.41,61 Compared with clade 0, the 
cases with clade 1, and subclades 2.1 and 2.3 were more 
likely to result in death with a crude OR of 2·8 (95% CI 
0·93–9·6), 11·0 (3·5–37·8), and 3·2 (1·0–11·4), 
respectively (appendix p 10). However, the risk of death 
between cases with clade 0 and subclade 2.1 was not 
signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent (OR 1·0, 95% CI 0·3–3·3). Based 
on the available information, the virus clades isolated 
from human beings were the same as the clades 
circulating in local poultry.21,28 From late 2003 to mid-
2005, most H5N1 infections in humans were caused by 
clade 1 strains in southeast Asia (ie, Vietnam, Thailand, 
and Cambodia).61
First identiﬁ ed, 
year
Locations identiﬁ ed Case-fatality risk
Clade 0 1997 Hong Kong 33% (6/18)
Clade 1 2003 Hong Kong, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Thailand
59% (112/191)
Subclade 2.1 2005 Indonesia 85% (176/208)
Subclade 2.2 2005 Turkey, Egypt, Azerbaijan, 
Djibouti, Iraq, Nigeria, and 
Bangladesh
33% (130/391)
Subclade 2.3 2005 Mainland China, Laos, 
Myanmar, Vietnam, Hong Kong, 
Bangladesh, and Canada
62% (55/89)
Clade 7 2003 Mainland China 100% (2/2)
Data on H5N1 clade or subclade of human cases were based on the reports from WHO website or scientiﬁ c literature, 
and the known geographic distribution of the viruses. Not all cases were laboratory conﬁ rmed and reported with clade 
results, so we presumed that the patient was infected by the reported clade or subclade of H5N1 in the same period 
and area. Clade data were unavailable for four cases in Pakistan in 2007, and four cases with unknown outcome (two in 
Vietnam in 2005 and two in Egypt in 2015) were also excluded.  
Table 2: Clade or subclade and fatality of human case with H5N1 infection, May, 1997, to April, 2015
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Although the highly pathogenic H5N1 strains can be 
expected to continue evolving over time, preliminary 
laboratory investigation has not detected major genetic 
changes in the viruses isolated from the patients or 
animals in 2014–15 compared with previously circulating 
isolates in the same regions,41,81 and the genetic diversity 
of the inﬂ uenza H5N1 virus decreased substantially 
between 1996 and 2011 in China, presumably under 
strong selective pressure associated with vaccination in 
poultry.55 However, other inﬂ uenza A H5 virus subtypes, 
such as H5N2, H5N3, H5N6, and H5N8, have been 
detected in birds in Europe, North America, and Asia, 
and no human cases of infection have been reported so 
far, with the exception of three human cases of 
inﬂ uenza A H5N6 virus infection detected in China in 
2014–15.39,74 However, the co-circulation of inﬂ uenza A 
viruses in human reservoirs and animal reservoirs can 
provide opportunities for these viruses to reassort and 
acquire genetic characteristics that facilitate sustained 
human-to-human transmission—a necessary trait of 
pandemic viruses.3,82
Vaccines and antivirals are the most eﬀ ective 
approaches to prevent inﬂ uenza virus infection and treat 
illness, respectively.41,83,84 Vaccination of poultry has been 
implemented in many of the aﬀ ected countries to 
control H5N1 in poultry, especially in those locations 
where inﬂ uenza H5N1 viruses have become enzootic in 
poultry and wild birds.85–87 27 H5N1 candidate vaccine 
viruses for human beings are available and a new 
candidate vaccine is in preparation to protect against the 
circulating H5 clade 2.2.1.2 of viruses in Egypt.41,88 The 
ﬁ rst adjuvant vaccine for the prevention of inﬂ uenza 
H5N1 virus was approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration in November, 2013, and this vaccine is 
being stockpiled for pandemic preparedness by the US 
Government.89 Additionally, the antiviral drug 
oseltamivir can reduce the severity of illness and 
mortality when started soon after symptom onset and 
appears to beneﬁ t all age groups. Prompt diagnosis and 
early therapeutic intervention should therefore be 
considered for all H5N1 cases,84,90,91 though antiviral 
resistance continues to receive attention and continued 
monitoring is needed.92 The availability of antivirals and 
vaccines in the event of an H5N1 pandemic should be 
considered in advance.93
There are some limitations to this study. First, the 
data used were collated from diﬀ erent sources. The data 
quality might be inﬂ uenced by key steps in public health 
surveillance or reports including case deﬁ nitions, 
reporting methods, availability of health care and 
laboratory diagnostics, under-reporting, and the com-
pleteness and accuracy of data reported or announced 
by diﬀ erent countries or organisations. Compared with 
the areas in which many cases were seen in this study, 
some countries with few or no cases reported might be 
attributed to the low availability and capability of public 
health services, serological testing, and surveillance. 
Second, detailed data on case characteristics and clinical 
management were unavailable to assess the association 
between clinical manifestation, treatment, and outcome, 
and this study did not include the cases with subclinical 
H5N1 infection, which have been occasionally 
reported.70,94–96 Third, the ﬁ ndings might be aﬀ ected by 
missing data on exposure, outcome, and hospital 
admission, and the misclassiﬁ cation of cases with 
presumed clade or subclade. Additionlly, this study only 
included data sources in English or Chinese, which 
might neglect data on cases reported in other languages, 
including announcements or reports from Egypt.
In this Review, the high-risk areas, population groups, 
and seasonality of human highly pathogenic avian 
inﬂ uenza H5N1 virus infections have been 
systematically reviewed, providing evidence for the 
planning of prevention and control. The geographical 
distribution of countries with human H5N1 infections 
has expanded, especially between 2003 and 2008, with 
variations in outcome, demography, seasonality, and the 
clade or subclade of viruses across the region. The 
incidence of human infections increased dramatically 
in Egypt from November, 2014, to April, 2015, but 
remained at a low level in other regions, and the case-
fatality risk in Egypt has not signiﬁ cantly changed. 
However, since avian inﬂ uenza A H5N1 viruses present 
a continuous threat to human populations, echoing the 
recommendations of WHO and other organisations on 
inﬂ uenza at the human–animal interface,41,84,97–99 
sustained eﬀ orts and close collaboration between the 
animal health sectors and public health sectors at 
community, national, and international levels to 
monitor the dynamics in human beings, poultry, and 
wild birds, and to conduct early clinical management is 
needed. Downstream research should focus on the 
development of vaccines and antivirals, explore the 
driving factors behind the epidemic, and assess the 
potential for future pandemics.
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